How do intellectual property rights that determine the market power of firms influence the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy? To analyze this question, we develop a monetary endogenous-growth model in which R&D and capital accumulation are both engines of long-run economic growth. We find that monetary expansion hurts economic growth and social welfare by reducing R&D and capital accumulation. Furthermore, a larger market power of firms strengthens these growth and welfare effects of monetary policy through the R&D channel but weakens these effects through the capital-accumulation channel. Therefore, whether the market power of firms amplifies or mitigates the welfare cost of inflation depends on the relative importance of the two growth engines. Finally, we calibrate the model using data in the United States and the Euro Area to quantitatively evaluate and compare the welfare cost of inflation in these two economies and find that the R&D channel dominates in both economies.
Introduction
Since the seminal study by Tobin (1965) , the relationship between inflation and economic growth has been a fundamental issue in monetary economics, and there is now an established literature on monetary policy and economic growth. 1 The present study relates to this literature by analyzing an unexplored implication that the market structure has an influence on the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy. Specifically, we analyze how intellectual property rights that determine the market power of firms influence the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare in a monetary endogenous-growth model in which R&D and capital accumulation are both engines of long-run economic growth. We find that monetary expansion that increases inflation raises the cost of consumption relative to leisure consequently reducing labor supply, which is an important factor input for R&D and capital accumulation. A reduction in this factor input in turn decreases economic growth and social welfare. Interestingly, the magnitude of these growth and welfare effects of monetary policy depends on the strength of patent protection. Specifically, a larger market power of firms strengthens the effects of monetary policy through the R&D channel but weakens these effects through the capitalaccumulation channel. Thus, the market power of firms has drastically different implications on the welfare cost of inflation under the two growth engines. Whether it amplifies or mitigates the welfare cost of inflation depends on the relative importance of the two growth engines.
The above theoretical finding has an important implication on a recent policy reform. As a result of the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 2 many countries have strengthened their protection for intellectual property rights. For example, according to the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in Park (2008) , 1 See for example Gillman and Kejak (2005) for a survey of this literature. 2 The WTO's TRIPS Agreement, which was initiated in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, establishes a minimum level of intellectual property protection that must be provided by all member countries by 2006. 107 countries have experienced an increase in the strength of patent rights from 1995 to 2005. 3 In these 107 countries, the average increase in the Ginarte-Park index is 0.82. 4 Our theoretical result implies that the welfare cost of inflation would have increased in some of these countries.
Given that innovation is likely to be the main engine of economic growth in developed countries, these countries would experience a larger welfare cost of inflation as a result of stronger patent protection. In contrast, for a developing country in which the main engine of growth is capital accumulation, our result implies that it should experience a smaller welfare cost of inflation as a result of stronger patent protection.
The reason why the strength of patent protection has different implications on the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy under the two growth engines is as follows. For a given supply of labor, increasing the market power of firms raises the incentives for innovation and the share of labor devoted to R&D. This increase in the R&D share of labor tends to magnify the growth and welfare effects of the decrease in labor supply driven by monetary expansion. In contrast, increasing the market power of firms reduces the income share of physical capital and the share of labor devoted to capital accumulation. This decrease in the capital share of labor tends to mitigate the growth and welfare effects of the decrease in labor supply driven by monetary expansion. Therefore, the market power of firms has drastically different implications on the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy as the relative importance of the two growth engines changes. In other words, the effects of monetary policy are influenced by an interaction between the growth engine and the market power of firms. To our knowledge, this interaction has never been explored in the literature.
In the quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model using data in the United States (US) and the Euro Area (EA) to quantitatively evaluate and compare the welfare cost of inflation in these two economies. We consider currency and M1 as alternative measures of money. In both economies, we find that the welfare cost of inflation is much higher under the M1 specification than under the currency specification as in Dotsey and Ireland (1996) . We also find a significant difference in the welfare cost of inflation between the EA and the US when we use M1 as the measure of money but a negligible difference between the two economies when we consider currency as the measure of money. Under both money specifications, we find that increasing the markup magnifies the effects of inflation on economic growth and social welfare in both the US and the EA; in other words, the R&D channel dominates the capital-accumulation channel. Tobin (1965) argues that higher inflation stimulates the accumulation of physical capital via the substitution with money holding. In contrast to Tobin (1965) , when money is required for purchasing capital goods (Stockman, 1981) , higher anticipated inflation reduces real balances, capital investment and the level of output (i.e., the reversed Tobin effect). This theoretical result is also consistent with many subsequent studies in the literature that consider variants of the AK model with a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption goods and analyze the growth and welfare effects of inflation through elastic labor supply. For example, Gomme (1993) and Mino (1997) introduce money into the two-sector Lucas (1988) model via cash-in-advance constraints and emphasize how the money growth rate affects the consumption-leisure decision. 5 Our result of a negative effect of inflation on economic growth is driven by a similar mechanism as these studies. 6 Another branch of studies, such as Zhang (1996) and Jha et al. (2002) , highlights the role of money in facilitating transactions for which a change in the inflation rate affects the consumption-leisure decision through transaction costs. 7 These studies in general support the negative relationship between inflation and economic growth regardless of whether the model is based on a cash-in-advance constraint or transaction costs. 8 In the present study, we explore a related growth-inflation relationship but introduce an additional growth engine that is R&D-driven innovation. Specifically, we incorporate a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption goods into a unified endogenous-growth model in which R&D and capital accumulation are both engines of long-run growth and allow for elastic labor supply.
Literature review
In contrast to the well-established literature on monetary policy in the AK model, a small but growing number of studies, such as Marquis and Reffett (1994) , Kromen (2006, 2010) and , has analyzed the effects of monetary policy on economic growth in the R&D-based growth model. The seminal study by Marquis and Reffett (1994) incorporates a transaction-service sector along with a cash-in-advance constraint into the Romer model. They show that higher inflation reduces growth through a reallocation of factor inputs from R&D and production to transaction services. Our model features a different mechanism from the MarquisReffett model by having a negative effect of inflation on economic growth through a reduction in labor supply. incorporate money demand into a quality-ladder model similar to Grossman and Helpman (1991) with a money-in-utility specification and analyze how the high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, then there may be multiple balanced-growth paths that feature different growth effects of inflation. 6 A recent study by Chu, Lai and Liao (2012) analyzes the effects of inflation on economic growth in the LagosWright search model with AK endogenous growth and also finds a negative effect of inflation on growth. 7 As for monetary growth models with money in utility, see for example Wang and Yip (1992) and Ho et al. (2007) . 8 In contrast, Itaya and Mino (2003) show that the Tobin effect (i.e., a positive growth effect of inflation) may emerge in an endogenous-growth model with transaction costs when labor externalities are sufficiently large.
elasticity of substitution between consumption and the real money balance affects the growth and welfare effects of inflation. 9 Kromen (2006, 2010) In an early study, Mansfield (1980) points out that higher inflation may reduce R&D by decreasing investment in the plant and equipment that are necessary for R&D and by increasing uncertainty on relative prices. Goel and Ram (2001) provide empirical evidence to confirm the latter effect by showing that inflation uncertainty has a negative effect on R&D. A recent study by provides further empirical evidence that supports a negative relationship between R&D and the level of inflation using cross-country regressions. In addition to empirical studies, policy-oriented research also suggests that high inflation could potentially reduce R&D investment. For example, in Economic Development Indicators (chapter 8, 2005) , "… high and volatile inflation also discourages investment, including human capital and R&D investment."
This study also relates to the literature on patent policy and economic growth. The seminal study in this literature is Judd (1985) , who analyzes the effects of patent length on economic growth in a dynamic general-equilibrium framework; see also Iwaisako and Futagami 9 In the monetary quality-ladder model in , a larger markup would also strengthen the effects of monetary policy through the R&D channel; however, their model does not feature the capital-accumulation channel. 10 Vaona (2012) incorporates nominal rigidity into an AK-style model with learning by doing to analyze the growth effects of inflation, and he provides empirical evidence that shows a negative effect of inflation on economic growth.
(2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) . Instead of patent length, we consider patent breadth against imitation; 11 see also Li (2001) , Goh and Olivier (2002) , Kwan and Lai (2003), Furukawa (2007) and Cysne and Turchick (2012) . However, our model differs from these studies by modeling R&D and physical capital as two engines of long-run growth. Because patent breadth has asymmetric effects on R&D and capital accumulation, the overall effect of strengthening patent protection on economic growth is ambiguous due to a tradeoff between R&D and capital accumulation as in Iwaisako and Futagami (2012) . 12 The present study relates to this literature by analyzing how patent policy interacts with monetary policy to affect growth and welfare.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the monetary endogenousgrowth model. Section 3 analyzes the effects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare. Section 4 calibrates the model to numerically evaluate the welfare cost of inflation in the EA and the US. Section 5 considers an extension of the model to examine the robustness of our results. The final section concludes.
A monetary endogenous-growth model
To analyze the interactive effects of monetary policy and patent policy, we modify the seminal R&D-based growth model in Romer (1990) by (a) introducing a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption goods to model money demand, (b) considering variable patent breadth as in Goh and Olivier (2002), (c) incorporating a capital-producing sector as in Iwaisako and Futagami (2012) so that capital accumulation is also an engine of long-run growth, and (d) allowing for
11 Chu (2010) shows that at the current patent length of 20 years, extending the patent length would have negligible effects on R&D and social welfare. Therefore, we focus on the analysis of patent breadth in this study. 12 See also Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012) , who analyze the asymmetric effects of blocking patents on variety expansion and quality improvement in an R&D-based growth model. elastic labor supply. Given that the Romer model has been well-studied, the standard features of the model will be briefly described below to conserve space.
Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a lifetime utility function given by Dotsey and Ireland (1996) to consider a more general setup in which only a fraction of 13 Our results are robust to a more general utility function given by
for χ ≥ 0. Derivations are available upon request from the authors. However, when χ > 0, the equilibrium allocations do not have closedform solutions. Therefore, we focus on the special case of χ = 0 for analytical tractability. consumption expenditure is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
14 This generalization allows us to perform a more realistic quantitative investigation on the welfare cost of inflation.
Using standard dynamic optimization, the optimality condition for consumption is
where t λ is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2), and
is the nominal interest rate that captures the opportunity cost of holding money as opposed to accumulating tangible or intangible capital. The optimality condition for labor supply is
The familiar intertemporal optimality condition is
Final goods
Final goods t y are produced by a standard CES aggregator using production labor t y l , and a continuum of differentiated intermediates goods
where t n is the number of intermediate goods available. This sector is perfectly competitive, and the producers take the output and input prices as given. The conditional demand functions for production labor and intermediate goods are respectively 14 See also Wu and Zhang (1998) who consider a generalized cash-in-advance constraint.
-9 -where ) ( j p t is the price of ) ( j x t relative to final goods.
Intermediate goods
There is a continuum of industries producing intermediate goods
industry is occupied by a monopolist who rents capital to produce intermediate goods in an oneto-one fashion; i.e., )
The monopolistic profit is
where t q is the rental price of capital.
The unconstrained optimization yields a profit-maximizing markup of α / 1 . Here we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to introduce patent breadth denoted by η as a policy variable by assuming that the unit cost of producing imitative products is increasing in patent breadth. 15 Thus, without sufficient strength of patent protection, the presence of monopolistic profits attracts imitation. Therefore, stronger patent protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a larger markup without the threat of imitation; see Li (2001) for a similar formulation of patent breadth in the quality-ladder model. This formulation is also consistent with Gilbert and Shapiro's (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price". In summary, the maximum markup is determined by η . 16 For the rest of this study, we assume α η / 1 < , 17 so that
. This formulation also serves to provide a simple way to separate capital share α and markup η . The amount of profit is symmetric across industries and given by
where the second equality of (11) uses the market-clearing condition for capital goods
Equation (11) shows that a larger markup η increases the amount of monopolistic profits, which in turn improves incentives for R&D investment; however, a larger η also decreases the capital share of income
, 18 which in turn worsens incentives for capital accumulation. 
R&D
This condition determines the allocation of labor to capital accumulation.
Monetary authority
The growth rate of money supply t M is denoted by
that is exogenously set by the monetary authority. Given the definition of the real money balance
(where t P is the price of final goods), the inflation rate t π is endogenously determined by 20 Here we have made a simplifying assumption of zero capital depreciation as in Romer (1990) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2012) . 21 In Section 5, we consider an alternative specification for the laws of motion for capital and variety that allows for cross-sector spillovers.
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Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations (5) and (18), we obtain the steady-state nominal interest rate
and equating the resulting condition with (7) yield the equilibrium allocation of production labor (7), (11) and (14) into (12) Lemma 2: The equilibrium labor allocations are given by
Proof: See Appendix A.□
Growth and welfare effects of monetary policy
On the balanced-growth path, the growth rate of output is 
Equation (20) shows that r l is increasing in η . Intuitively, larger patent breadth increases monopolistic profits and the value of an invention providing more incentives for R&D. Equation (20) also shows that r l is decreasing in µ . Intuitively, a larger µ increases inflation, which in turn raises the cost of holding money that is required for purchasing consumption goods. As a result, households consume more leisure reducing the supply of labor l as shown in (22) 
To see this, substituting (19) into (21) 23 In an earlier version of this study, we provide this analysis in the two models; see Chu, Lai and Liao (2010). unified model is that we can analyze the effects of inflation when R&D and capital accumulation are both engines of long-run growth. Substituting (20) and (21) into (24) ). Finally, whether patent breadth strengthens the growth effect of monetary policy depends on the same parameter condition
), then increasing patent breadth would strengthen (weaken) the negative effect of monetary policy on economic growth. . As for the effect of money growth on welfare, it is negative (i.e., 0
because the negative effects of µ on 0 c and y g dominate the positive effect of increased leisure.
Finally, whether patent breadth strengthens the welfare effect of monetary policy depends on the same parameter condition
), then increasing patent breadth would strengthen (weaken) the negative effect of monetary policy on social welfare. Proof: Substitute (19), (22) and (25) 
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to provide a numerical analysis on the growth and welfare effects of inflation and quantitatively examine whether the markup magnifies or mitigates these effects. We consider two monetary aggregates, currency and M1, as alternative measures of money held by households for the purpose of facilitating transactions. On the one hand, currency holding by households is a subset of monetary assets that are subject to the cost of inflation. On the other hand, M1 includes interest-bearing assets, such as demand deposits, which are partly immune to the depreciation effect of inflation. Therefore, we report the welfare cost of inflation computed based on currency as a lower bound and the welfare cost computed based on M1 as an upper bound. For the EA, we set the cash-in-advance parameter c m / = ξ to 0.10 when we match the average ratio of currency to households' final consumption expenditure from 1999 to 2010, and we set ξ to 0.66 when we match the ratio of M1 to consumption. For the US, we set ξ to 0.08 when we match the ratio of currency to consumption and ξ to 0.16 when we match the ratio of M1 to consumption.
For each of the other parameters, we either set it to a conventional value or calibrate its value using an empirical moment based on data from 1999 to 2010. For the money growth rate, we calibrate it using π µ + = y g , where y g and π are taken from the data (to be reported in Table 1 ). For the R&D and capital productivity parameters φ and ϕ , we calibrate them using the output and capital growth rates y g and k g from the data. Given y g and k g , the variety growth rate can be computed as
For the markup η , we calibrate it using R&D as a percentage of GDP. Then, we use capital investment as a percentage of GDP to calibrate the value of ρ , and we use the labor share of income to calibrate the value of α . Finally, we calibrate the labor supply parameter ψ by setting the supply of labor l to 0.33. In Table 1, we report the values of all these variables and parameters.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Numerical results
The policy experiment that we consider is to reduce the money growth rate to the level that achieves the Friedman rule (i.e., 0 = i which implies ρ µ − = ). Table 2 shows that under both the currency and M1 specifications, reducing money growth increases economic growth and social welfare in both the EA and the US. 24 However, the changes in the capital growth rate and the variety growth rate respond differently to the markup. Specifically, a larger markup increases the magnitude of the changes in the variety growth rate in response to lower inflation. In contrast, a larger markup decreases the magnitude of the changes in the capital growth rate in response to lower inflation. Overall, we find that the R&D channel dominates the capital-accumulation channel such that a larger markup tends to increase the magnitude of the changes in economic growth and social welfare in response to lower inflation. In other words, a larger market power of firms tends to magnify the welfare cost of inflation in these economies.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
In the EA, the welfare cost of inflation under the M1 specification is 5.79% whereas the welfare cost under the currency specification is 0.88%. In the US, the welfare costs of inflation under the M1 and currency specifications are 1.76% and 0.89% respectively. Therefore, in both economies, the welfare cost of inflation is much higher under the M1 specification than under the currency specification. Furthermore, when we use currency as the measure of money, we find a
where we have used
Equation (39) shows that for a given t t k n / , capitalproducing labor k l is decreasing in η . Therefore, this model also features the tradeoff of patent breadth on capital and R&D, and this tradeoff will be reflected in the common growth rate being a non-monotonic function in η .
Combining (19), (33), (36) and (39) yield the equilibrium allocations of r l and k l respectively given by
Finally, we can compute the supply of labor given by
Substituting (33), (40) and (41) into (31) or (32) yields
which is also the growth rate of output because
in this model. Equation (43) shows that the growth rate is an inverted-U function in patent breadth η due to the tradeoff between R&D and capital investment as in Iwaisako and Futagami (2012) and the growth rate reaches a maximum at 2 ≡ =η η
. Also, the growth rate is always decreasing in the money growth rate µ as before. Whether increasing patent breadth strengthens or weakens this negative effect of monetary policy on economic growth depends on whether η is on the upward-sloping side (i.e., the R&D channel dominates) or the downward-sloping side (i.e., the capital-accumulation channel dominates) of the curve. Given that the empirical markup is often estimated to be less than 100% (i.e., 2 < η ), 25 the R&D channel is likely to dominate the capital-accumulation channel. Finally, one can also show that on the balanced growth path, welfare is monotonically decreasing in the money growth rate µ , and increasing patent breadth strengthens (weakens) this negative effect of monetary policy on welfare if η is less (greater) than η . 
Conclusion
In this study, we have revisited a fundamental question in monetary economics originally raised by Tobin (1965) on the relationship between inflation and economic growth. The key departure from the literature is that we consider both innovation and capital accumulation as engines of 25 See for example Jones and Williams (2000) for a discussion on the empirical range of the markup. 26 Derivations are contained in an unpublished appendix (please see Appendix B) that is available upon request.
-25 -economic growth in the long run. In summary, we find that the growth and welfare effects of inflation and monetary policy are largely influenced by an unexplored interaction between the growth engine and the strength of patent protection. We believe that this interaction sheds some light on the importance of the growth engine and an interaction between monetary and patent policies that have been neglected in the growth-inflation literature.
Finally, it is well-known that the Romer model exhibits scale effects. 27 In this study, we normalize the size of population to unity, so that population size does not appear in the equilibrium growth rate. Instead, it is the supply of labor that affects growth; in other words, when R&D scientists and engineers devote more time to research, they generate more inventions.
We believe that this implication is more plausible than the original version of scale effects based on population size. Nevertheless, it may be fruitful for future studies to further revisit the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy using other vintages of the R&D-based growth model. 27 See Jones (1999) for an excellent discussion on scale effects in R&D-based growth models.
Appendix B (not for publication)
In this unpublished appendix, we provide a proof for the following results in the extended model of Section 5. On the balanced growth path, welfare is monotonically decreasing in the money growth rate µ , and patent breadth strengthens (weakens) this negative effect of monetary policy on welfare if η is less (greater) than 2 ≡ η .
From (26), we can obtain the balanced-growth level of social welfare given by
From the proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix A, the steady-state ratio of (42) and (43), we can show that the effects of monetary policy on production labor, labor supply and economic growth are respectively 
B6) shows that welfare is monotonically decreasing in the money growth rate µ .
Finally, taking the absolute value of (B6) and differentiating it with respect to η yields 
